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ABSTRACT 
 Being able to predict a merger or acquisition before it takes place could lead to an 
investor earning a premium, if they owned shares of the targeted firm before the merger or 
acquisition attempt is announced.  On average acquiring firms pay a premium when acquiring or 
merging with a targeted firm.  This study uses publicly available financial information for 7,267 
attempted takeover targets and 52,343 non-targeted firms for the period January 3, 2000 through 
December 31, 2007 to estimate (using logit) predictive models.  Financial ratios are constructed 
based on six hypotheses found in the literature.  Although statistical evidence supports a few of 
the hypotheses, the low predictive power of the models does not indicate the ability to accurately 
predict targeted firms ahead of time, let alone with any economic significance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) process is one researchers have spent the past four 
decades examining.  M&A deals exist for both publicly held and privately held companies.  An 
advantage of examining publicly held and traded companies versus privately held companies is 
the access to their (publicly available) company-specific financial information; most importantly 
filings with the U.S. SEC and common stock price data.  For this reason, most research examines 
public company data.  One reason one might want to predict mergers and acquisitions is that a 
researcher can use financial characteristics and other public data in building a model to forecast 
potential targets.  A target is a firm that is being sought by another firm (the acquiror), which is 
then either absorbed into, or merged with the acquiror.  Being able to predict which firms are 
likely targets would be beneficial for a firm who is looking to remain independent because they 
―may alter their financial characteristics and hence forestall acquisition…Furthermore, there is 
potential for individual investors to profit from knowing in advance which firms are likely to be 
taken over‖ (Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq 1999, p. 3).  The difference between a merger and an 
acquisition is minimal and thus all deals discussed in this paper will not seek to differentiate 
between the two.  The minimal difference between mergers and acquisitions is that both types of 
deals appear to possibly reward common stockholders because acquirors typically pay a 
premium for the target company.     
M&A deals generally begin with internal (private) meetings between the acquiror and the 
potential target.  If these meetings are satisfactory for both the potential acquiror‘s and target‘s 
boards of directors, a Letter of Intent is sent to the target by the acquiror.  The Letter of Intent is 
a document which contains contingencies based on firm characteristics such as financial 
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statements, annual reports, a general breakdown of the customer base, and a review of 
capitalization and ownership structure (Paulson 2000).  This information can be extremely 
private, therefore target firms need reasonable assurance that the potential acquiror won‘t steal 
their proprietary information.  This is accomplished through legal forms which protect their 
sensitive information, such as a Non-Disclosure Agreement.   
If these contingencies are agreed upon, then the two parties will proceed to the next step, 
the Due Diligence stage.  During the Due Diligence stage the target allows the potential acquiror 
to see specific inner workings of the target‘s day-to-day operations.  This can lead to a potential 
conflict of interest if the acquiror walks away from (abandons) the deal knowing the inner 
workings of the target.  For that reason the contingencies listed in the Letter of Intent will contain 
certain non-disclosure clauses regarding proprietary information being passed along from the 
target to the acquiror.   
If the Due Diligence stage proves satisfactory to both parties, they will seek an 
appropriate financing arrangement.  When determining appropriate financing, it is not 
uncommon for deals to take months or years to be agreed upon (Paulson 2000).  After financing 
has been agreed upon (assuming a publicly held entity), shareholders must vote to approve the 
deal.  If the shareholders do not approve the deal, the acquiror may restructure the terms and 
again attempt to gain shareholder approval.  If shareholders approve and the board of directors of 
the target firm remains interested in the deal, a friendly takeover may take place.  The parties 
then enter the stage of the agreement where the target‘s employees (or acquiror‘s new 
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employees) guide the acquiror‘s management by ―making sure the acquired company perform[s] 
up to its purchased expectations‖ (Paulson 2000). 
 During the early internal meetings between the target and potential acquiror, the attempt 
to acquire the target may be viewed by the target‘s board of directors either positively or 
negatively.  As stated earlier, if an offer is viewed in a positive way by the board of directors, a 
friendly transaction may take place; however, if the target‘s board of directors opposes the offer 
and the acquiror continues to pursue the deal, it becomes a hostile takeover attempt.   
Hostile takeovers can assume many forms.  One of these is a tender offer (cash tender 
offers are illegal in the U.S. under the Williams Act).  In a tender offer, the acquiring company 
makes a public offer to the target shareholders at a fixed price above the current market price.  If 
50% plus one shares are tendered, the deal is successful.  The acquiror may also work to attain 
the support or agreement of a simple majority of the target‘s shareholders, whereby those 
shareholders vote out current management and replace it with one that will approve the deal.  
This is known as a proxy fight.  Alternatively, the potential acquiror may purchase shares of the 
target on the open market so they can appoint a representative to the target‘s board of directors—
this is called a creeping tender offer.   
Gaining management‘s initial approval of a proposed acquisition is not the only concern 
for a potential acquiror; financing is another.  M&A transactions are rather large, with an average 
deal size of $356M during the first five months of 2011 (Bloomberg 2011 M&A Outlook), and 
financing may take more than one form. The acquiror may offer cash for shares of the target, an 
exchange of their common shares for shares of the target, or some combination of cash and 
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stock.  In an all-cash deal, the acquiror pays a fixed amount per share of the target‘s common 
stock.  In all-stock offers, the acquiror agrees to exchange its shares for the stock of the target.  
According to Van Wyk (2010), the acquiror‘s stock sees ―negative drift in the year following a 
takeover announcement‖ (p.15).  Negative drift means that share prices of acquiring firms has 
been found to decrease on average after M&A deals have been announced.   
The next step of the M&A process is for the acquiring firm to seek majority shareholder 
approval.  Target firms may already have in place different safeguards designed to protect 
themselves in the event of a hostile takeover attempt.  One such measure is simply increasing the 
proportion of shareholders needed to approve a takeover to a supermajority.  Supermajority 
shareholder approval is a requirement for shareholder approval which is above 50% plus one 
shares.  The purpose is to decrease the likelihood of shareholder approval of a takeover.  Another 
measure the target firm may enact is a poison pill.   A poison pill allows all but majority 
shareholders to buy new shares at a discount—this can greatly increase the purchase price of a 
target firm, if the target is being sought by an outside acquiror.   
In the event the acquiring firm achieves a shareholder majority, a transaction may occur.  
As discussed earlier, these deals may have rather large stock price movements, which means 
investors may be able to profit. Investors looking to profit from M&A transactions are usually 
looking to receive the typical premium, paid by the acquiror, over the target‘s share price as of 
the announcement date. To do this, the investor must be holding the target firm in their portfolio 
when the potential takeover is announced.  The majority (45%) of premiums paid by acquirors 
during 2010 were under 10%, 15% of premiums were in the 10%-25% range, and 30% of deals 
5 
 
resulted in a premium between 25% and 50% (Bloomberg 2011 M&A Outlook).  If investors 
hold just a small number of these target stocks in their portfolio, they may earn returns greater 
than their benchmark (termed abnormal returns).   
This research project attempts to develop a model to predict potential targets.  Only a few 
researchers have built models which produce the desired results.  Therefore, the goal of this 
paper is to design and estimate a model of M&A target identifications which is superior to those 
found in the existing literature.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Predicting potential targets of an M&A deal using financial characteristics began with the 
work of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971).  Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) find evidence of a 
difference in financial characteristics between target firms and acquiring firms.  Using a multiple 
discriminant model, they find that targets have smaller market capitalization, lower price-to-
earnings (P/E) ratios, lower dividend payout ratios, and lower equity growth than that of their 
acquiring firm counterparts.  A potential flaw of multiple discriminant analysis is the underlying 
assumptions of the model which tend to inflate its predictive ability (Palepu 1986).  Multiple 
discriminant analysis assumes normality of data, uses equal-size (referred to as equal-share) 
samples of both targets and non-targets (any firm that is not a target), and assumes equality of 
dispersion matrices.  Nevertheless, their study provides a framework for predicting mergers and 
acquisitions from differences in the target and acquiring firms‘ financial characteristics. 
Stevens (1973) finds evidence contrary to the findings of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971).  
He finds that liquidity is an important factor differentiating between targets and acquiring firms, 
but not the dividend payout ratio or P/E ratios.  Stevens (1973) uses a model similar to that of 
Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) which may therefore indicate an inflated predictive ability.  The 
conflicting view of these researchers and others—for example, Castagna and Matolcsy (1976), 
Belkoui (1978), and Dietrich and Sorenson (1984)—led to the formulation of six hypotheses 
about mergers and acquisitions.  They are: the Inefficient Management Hypothesis, the Growth-
Resource Mismatch Hypothesis, the Industry Disturbance Hypothesis, the Firm Size Hypothesis, 
the Asset Undervaluation Hypothesis, and the Price-to-Earnings (P/E) Hypothesis. 
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The Inefficient Management Hypothesis ―is based on the finance theory premise that 
acquisitions are a mechanism by which managers of a firm who fail to maximize its market value 
are replaced‖ (Palepu 1986).  Inefficient management has been proxied by a number of variables 
that are expected to be inversely related to the likelihood of a takeover.  These variables relate to 
profitability, dividends and dividend growth, or average excess stock return.  Palepu (1986), 
Barnes (1999), Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999), and Cudd and Duggal (2000) find evidence 
supporting this hypothesis. 
The Growth-resource Mismatch Hypothesis is based on the notion that a mismatch 
between a firm‘s growth and its financial resources make the firm a likely target.  This ―implies 
that two types of firms are likely targets: low-growth, resource-rich firms and high-growth, 
resource-poor firms‖ (Palepu 17).   The variables used to proxy this hypothesis are sales growth, 
liquidity, leverage, and slight variations thereof and are expected to be directly (positively) 
related to the probability of a takeover.  These variables are ―commonly put forward in the 
popular financial press as well as in corporate finance textbooks‖ (Palepu 17).  Palepu (1986), 
Barnes (1999), Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999), Cudd and Duggal (2000), Powell (2004), 
Camerlynck, Ooghe, and Langhe (2005), Baixauli (2009), and Pervan (2010) find evidence 
supporting this hypothesis. 
The Industry Disturbance Hypothesis is based on ―economic disturbance theory [which] 
suggests that acquisitions cluster by industry.  A factor that signals the acquisition likelihood of a 
firm is, therefore, the recent history of acquisitions in its industry‖ (Palepu 18).  This direct 
influence is proxied by a dummy variable signifying whether or not there has been any M&A 
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activity in the appropriate sector during the previous fiscal year (prior to observation).  Palepu 
(1986) and Cudd and Duggal (2000) find evidence supporting this hypothesis. 
The Firm Size Hypothesis proposes that smaller firms are likely to be takeover targets, 
similar to the findings of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971).  This idea is based on the premise that 
smaller firms have less ―transaction cost‖ associated with being takeovers than larger firms.  If a 
hostile takeover attempt occurs, smaller firms are unlikely to be able to ―defend‖ themselves 
against a larger acquiror.  Palepu (1986), Cudd and Duggal (2000), Alcalde and Espitia (2003), 
and Pervan (2010) find an inverse relationship between firm size and takeover probability.   
 The Asset Undervaluation Hypothesis claims that firms with lower market-to-book ratios 
are more likely to be targets because they are ―cheap‖ relative to their higher market-to-book 
counterparts.  Since market-to-book value is based on accounting principles and not underlying 
asset prices, this hypothesis seems arbitrary.  Baixauli (2009) finds evidence supporting this 
hypothesis.   
The Price-to-Earnings Hypothesis suggests firms with lower P/E ratios are more likely to 
be acquired than those with higher P/E multiples.  Palepu 1986 claims: 
―According to the proponents of this hypothesis, bidders with high P/E ratios seek to 
acquire low P/E firms to realize an ‗instantaneous capital gain‘ because of the belief that 
the stock market values the earnings of the combination at the higher P/E ratio of the 
acquiror‖ (p. 18). 
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This variable, like the Asset Undervaluation Hypothesis, also suggests that firms with lower P/E 
ratios are ―undervalued‖ compared to their higher P/E ratio counterparts, possibly fueling a 
―bargain‖ takeover process.  
These six hypotheses were examined jointly by Palepu (1986). Palepu (1986) corrects the 
methodology of past researchers, such as Stevens (1973), by using modeling techniques which 
incorporate more robust assumptions allowing the model to be less biased in its predictive 
ability.  He uses a logit model, which can handle more robust (non-normal) data, rather than a 
binary model (such as multiple discriminant analysis). He also uses non-equal share samples, 
which further reduces bias in his modeling technique.  The use of a logit model requires an 
optimal cut-off probability be assumed, developed, and chosen (because a logit model estimates 
a potential target‘s probability of being acquired, not a yes/no (0, 1) decision.)  The 
determination of an optimal cut-off probability is critical in decision-making because a lower 
cut-off can potentially misclassify too many non-target firms as potential targets, and could 
possibly erase any potential abnormal returns (assuming equal weightings of potential targets in 
the portfolio).  In contrast, too high a cut-off probability will potentially misclassify target firms 
as non-targets, producing a portfolio with too few securities to be well-diversified.  The 
performance of a poorly diversified portfolio is too dependent on the performance of each 
security in it.  
Palepu‘s (1986) model has a target predictive ability of 80% and a non-target predictive 
ability of 45%.   According to him, ―the strategy of investing in the 625 [out of the possible 
1,117] firms identified by the model to be potential targets is found to result in statistically 
10 
 
insignificant excess returns‖ (p. 32).  He did, however, find support for four of the six academic 
hypotheses—Inefficient Management Hypothesis, Growth-resource Mismatch Hypothesis, 
Industry Disturbance Hypothesis, and Size Hypothesis. 
Barnes (1999) develops a new way to determine the optimal cut-off probability—sorting 
financial characteristics data by sector.  He suggests that Palepu‘s (1986) ―criterion of error 
minimization is inappropriate if out-performance of the market is the objective.‖ (p. 297)   In its 
place, he uses a ―profit-maximization criteria‖ which, alas, does not yield positive abnormal 
returns nor increase his model‘s predictive power relative to Palepu‘s (1986).  Barnes (1999) also 
uses what he calls industry-adjusted data.  These are financial data which are normalized by 
sector or industry.  Normalizing the data accounts for industry-specific dispersions.  One takes 
the observed value for a firm, subtracts the industry mean and divides by the industry standard 
deviation (this is also referred to as an industry-relative ratio).  While not producing positive 
abnormal investment returns, Barnes‘ models ―perform better than chance‖ (p. 283).  Cudd and 
Duggal (2000) verify the ability of industry-relative ratios to ―convey significant additional 
information‖ (p. 117).   
Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999) create a prediction model based on non-financial as 
well as financial characteristics.  They find evidence supporting five of their non-financial 
characteristic hypotheses:  the Control Hypothesis, the Attitude Hypothesis, the Previous Bids 
Hypothesis, the Litigation Hypothesis, and the Other Hypothesis.  They explain their hypotheses 
as follows:  
The Control Hypothesis suggests that there is a relationship between the degree of control 
officers have over the board and the probability of actual takeover occurring.  
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The Attitude Hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between a friendly takeover 
attempt and the likelihood of firm being merged or acquired. 
The Previous Bids Hypothesis suggests that the number of previous bids is positively 
related to the likelihood of being taken over. 
The Litigation Hypothesis brings in the dimension of legal issues arising in a takeover.  It 
is hypothesized that an inverse relationship exists between the presence of litigation and 
the likelihood of a targeted firm being taken over. 
The Other Hypothesis suggests an inverse relationship between the existence of other 
ongoing acquisition plans by the target or bidder (Other) and the likelihood of a targeted 
firm being taken over.  (Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999), pgs. 9-11) 
With proxies for these hypotheses, their model has a predictive accuracy of 62.9%, which 
is less than their financial characteristic model, which has 74.5% accuracy.  This suggests the 
need for a model inclusive of both financial and non-financial characteristics.  
Powell (2004) attempts to determine the appropriate method for estimating an optimal 
cut-off probability.  He adds another non-financial variable:  whether the proposed takeover is 
hostile or friendly.  He claims that ―multinomial (multiple variables) models generate significant 
and positive buy-and-hold abnormal returns when a strategy of predicting hostile targets only is 
adopted‖ (p.63).  While admitting that his model misclassifies large numbers of non-targets as 
hostile targets, he argues ―hostile multinomial portfolio reveals that while hostile targets 
correctly predicted by the model generate large positive abnormal returns, firms misclassified as 
hostile targets also earn positive abnormal returns‖ (p.63).  He explains further that ―hostile 
targets…are larger in size, so the multinomial model, by design, ‗filters out‘ firms that are more 
likely to be in financial distress, giving rise to a portfolio with positive abnormal returns‖ (p.63).  
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The insight provided by Palepu (1986), Barnes (1999), Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq 
(1999), and Powell (2004) have shaped the prediction literature to be more accurate, less biased, 
and inclusive of non-financial data.  The goal of this paper is to develop a model that 
incorporates parts from each of these prior studies and to estimate that model using the logit 
specifications and more recent available data. 
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3. DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Target Firm Data 
 Target firm data was collected from the SDC database for the time period January 3, 
2000 through December 31, 2007.  There were 82,617 target firms found during that time period.  
Of those target firms found, 7,267 had all of the available data needed to create the variables 
used in this study.  A target is defined as a firm that was merged into or acquired by another firm 
or attempted to be merged or acquired within a particular year.  It is very common for a target 
firm to have multiple observations as a non-target in prior years, but only be considered a target 
in the year it was acquired or attempted to be acquired. Figure 1 shows the number of targets in 
each year of the period studied.  The smaller bars in Figure 1 indicate the number of firms for 
which the merger or acquisition attempt was successful.  Figure 1 shows that there was very 
heavy M&A activity during the initial years of the period studied.  A decline in M&A activity 
took place after 2000-2002 and M&A activity became more stable.  Figure 1 indicates that a very 
low percentage of target firms are successfully acquired. 
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Figure 1: Total Targets for Time Frame (1/3/00 – 12/31/07) 
 
3.2 Non-Target Firm Data and Variable Specifications 
The non-target data was collected from the WRDS database.  91,763 non-target firm 
observations were collected and of those there were 52,343 which had all of the necessary 
information available for the variables used in this study.  The variables used in this study are 
described below in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variables Description 
Return on Equity Net Income / Common Equity 
Growth-Resource Dummy 
1 if firm has low growth-high liquidity-low leverage, or 
high growth-low liquidity-high leverage, 0 if otherwise 
Leverage Net Debt / Common Equity 
Liquidity Current Assets / Current Liabilities 
Industry Dummy 
1 if takeover attempt occurred in prior year sector, 0 if 
otherwise 
Size Total Assets 
Market-To-Book 
Market Value (4 weeks prior to announcement) / Book 
Value  
Price-To-Earnings 
Share price (4 weeks) prior to announcement / Earnings per 
Share 
*Note: all balance sheet and income statement items cover the last twelve months 
Following Palepu (1986), the Growth-Resource Dummy is 1 for ―low-growth, resource-rich 
firms and high-growth, resource-poor firms‖ and 0 otherwise.  Palepu (1986) defines high 
growth as five-year average revenue growth rate greater than the industry mean.  The Growth-
Resource Dummy in this study defines high growth as return on equity greater than the industry 
mean. This is an upward biased measure due to the ability of a company to payout some of its net 
income.  Two companies with the same return on equity may be growing differently due to the 
company‘s retention ratio (percent of net income retained).  The Liquidity, Size, Industry 
Dummy, Market-to-Book Ratio, and Price-to-Earnings variables follow Palepu (1986) as noted 
in Table 1.  The Leverage variable used in this study is defined slightly differently from Palepu‘s 
(1986) total debt-to-equity ratio.  The Industry Dummy variable ―…suggests that acquisitions 
cluster by industry‖ (Palepu 18).  This variable takes a value of 1 when a particular industry had 
M&A activity during the previous year.   
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3.3 Target and Acquiror Fims 
The data in Table 2 display the respective means of target and acquiror firms for the 
explanatory variables.  Data for the 7,267 target and 7,267 acquiror firms was gathered from the 
SDC Database. 
Table 2: Target‘s Versus Acquirors 
 Target Acquiror 
   
Return on Equity -0.494 0.099 
   
Liquidity (Current Ratio) 3.138 3.087 
   
Leverage (Net Debt/Common 
Equity 
1.358 0.124 
   
Size (Total Assets) 4160.127 5625.237 
   
Market-to-Book Ratio 5.510 3050.88 
   
Price-to-Earnings Ratio 16.313 40.566 
   
 
The differences between the target return on equity and acquiror return on equity mean 
values for the independent variables suggest target firms performed worse (lower ROE) than 
acquirers.  This is in agreement with the Inefficient Management Hypothesis which states 
―managers of a firm who fail to maximize its market value are replaced‖ (Palepu p. 16).  This 
finding confirms the work of Palepu (1986), Barnes (1999), Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq (1999), 
and Cudd and Duggal (2000). 
The minimal difference between target liquidity and acquiror liquidity suggests that 
targets have a current ratio similar to those of their non-target counterparts.  The liquidity proxy 
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is a component of the GRDummy variable which ―implies that two types of firms are likely 
targets: low-growth, resource-rich firms and high-growth, resource-poor firms‖ (Palepu p. 17).  
The targets found in this study appear to be resource-rich firms. 
The difference between mean target leverage (LEV) and mean acquiror leverage shows 
that acquirors had on average only twelve cents of debt per dollar of equity compared to targets 
which was more than ten times that amount.  The leverage difference shown in Table 2 may have 
been a function of what took place during the turn of the 21
st
 century—the credit crisis.  The 
relaxed federal regulation of commercial banks paired with artificially low interest rates created 
a loose credit environment.  This in turn could explain the higher return on equity for targets 
which were able to lever up returns.  Since this study ends in fiscal year 2007, the whole picture 
cannot be seen as the Great Recession began in the early parts of 2008. 
The mean size differential between targets and acquirors confirms the Firm Size 
Hypothesis, which claims that smaller firms are more likely to be takeover targets.  This is 
similar to the findings of Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) and in-line with the findings of Palepu 
(1986), Cudd and Duggal (2000), Alcalde and Espitia (2003), and Pervan (2010).   
The differences between the target and acquiror market-to-book ratios (MTB) offers 
support for the Asset Undervaluation Hypothesis which claims firms with lower market-to-book 
ratios are considered cheap compared to their high market-to-book counterparts. This supports 
the findings of Baixauli (2009).  The reason the average acquiror market-to-book ratio is 
significantly higher than the target average is from eight acquirors having MTB ratios over one 
million. 
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Finally, the lower target mean price-to-earnings ratio compared to acquiror price-to-
earnings ratio is in-line with the Price-to-Earnings Hypothesis which posits firms with lower P/E 
multiples are more likely to be acquired than those with higher P/E multiples. 
3.4 Model Specifications and Observation Normalization 
The logistic regression tests are conducted for three different samples of the available 
data.  The first test is the Control Model, analogous to Palepu‘s (1986) model in explanatory 
variables used and analogous to Barnes (1999) in terms of the method used to transform the data.  
The data was transformed by a process called normalization.  For the estimated models, all data 
were normalized by industry.  To normalize a variable means the following: 
 
Where X is the observed value found in the population, µ is the industry mean for that particular 
variable, and σ is the industry standard deviation for a particular variable.  The minimum and 
maximum values for normalized data can be construed as how many standard deviations that 
value was above or below the industry mean.   
The first test excludes observations in which any variables have a negative value (before 
normalization). The Semi-Relaxed (second) Model replaces the Price-to-Earnings variable with 
Net Income and includes observations in which Net Income is either positive or negative (before 
normalization).  The Relaxed (third) Model replaces the Net Income variable in place of the 
Price-to-Earnings variable and includes all observations. Since the Semi-Relaxed and Relaxed 
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Models include the Net Income variable with negative observations, the Return on Equity (Net 
Income / Common Equity) variable will also have negative observations.  
3.5 Expectations of Estimated Models 
The expectations for parameter estimates based on the six hypotheses (described earlier) 
are listed in Table 3.  These are identical to Palepu‘s (1986) expectations. 
Table 3: Expectations of Test Results 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Variable 
Parameter 
Expected 
Sign 
Inefficient Management  Return on Equity (ROE) - 
Growth-Resource 
Mismatch 
GRDUMMY 
LIQ 
LEV 
+ 
Industry Disturbance IDUMMY + 
Firm Size  SIZE - 
Asset Undervaluation MTB - 
Price-to-Earnings  PE - 
20 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Control Model Summary 
 Summary statistics for the target data (normalized) used in the Control Model are found 
below in Table 4.  Summary statistics for the non-target data (normalized) used in the Control 
Model are found in Table 5. 
Table 4: Target Summary Statistics for the Control Model 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
     
Return on Equity .079 3.357 -2.048 152.906 
Liquidity .280 2.318 -9.841 99.195 
Leverage -.083 .877 -2.721 24.073 
Size .520 4.184 -1.126 139.160 
Market-To-Book .024 1.026 -1.639 24.198 
Price-To-Earnings .035 1.855 -2.350 107.702 
Industry Dummy .775 .418 0 1 
Growth-Resource Dummy .335 .472 0 1 
  Observations = 4,896  
  
Table 5: Non-target Summary Statistics for the Control Model 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
     
Return on Equity .001 1.013 -1.641 40.365 
Liquidity .158 2.001 -2.974 178.356 
Leverage -.046 1.091 -5.841 54.719 
Size .464 5.659 -1.584 307.310 
Market-To-Book .020 1.394 -1.885 97.592 
Price-To-Earnings .007 1.304 -38.636 104.729 
Industry Dummy .759 .427 0 1 
Growth-Resource Dummy .323 .468 0 1 
  Observations = 19,328  
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For every data sample (observations in Control Model, Semi-Relaxed Model, and Relaxed 
Model), there is information across 70 industries—an industry being defined by the first two 
numbers of a firm‘s SIC code.  The logistic regression (logit) for the Control Model uses the 
normalized data summarized in Exhibits 5 and 6.  The estimated model is shown in Table 6.  
Statistical significance is derived from the p-value having a value less than .05. 
4.1.1 Control Model Estimation 
Pi  = Prob (TAKEOVERi = | ROEi, GRDUMMYi, LIQi, LEVi, IDUMMYi, SIZEi, MTBi, PEi) 
where TARGETi = 1 if firm I was targeted and TARGETi = 0 if firm I was not targeted.   
P(TARGETi) = α + β1ROEi + β2GRDUMMYi + β3LIQi + β4LEVi + β5IDUMMYi + β6SIZEi + 
β7MTBi + β8PEi  
 
Table 6: Estimated Control Model 
 
Logistic Regression                    Number of Observations 24,224 
         LR chi-squared(8) 37.850 
       Prob > Chi-squared 0.0000 
Log Likelihood = -12173.466       Pseudo R-squared 0.0016 
       
Ind. Variables Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z-score Prob > l z l 95% Confidence 
Interval 
       
Return on 
Equity 
.034 .0138 2.50 0.013 .007 .062 
Liquidity .024 .008 2.99 0.003 .008 .040 
Leverage -.059 .022 -2.70 0.007 -.101 -.016 
Size .002 .003 0.61 0.539 -.003 .007 
Market-to-
Book 
.006 .006 0.31 0.756 -.029 .040 
Price-to-
Earnings 
.012 .010 1.20 0.232 -.008 .031 
Industry 
Dummy 
.082 .038 2.13 0.033 .007 .156 
Growth 
Resource 
Dummy 
.055 .034 1.61 0.108 -.012 .121 
Constant -1.464 .035 -41.67 0.000 -1.533 -1.395 
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The Control Model predicts only .16% of the variation of being a target or non-target 
using the independent variables.  The variables that are statistically significant (using a 5% cut 
off p-value) in explaining whether a firm is a target are Return on Equity, Liquidity, Leverage, 
and the Industry Dummy.  The positive coefficient for the IDummy variable supports the 
Industry Disturbance Hypothesis which suggests acquisitions cluster by industry (a positive 
correlation).   The positive coefficient for the Liquidity variable supports the Growth-Resource 
Mismatch Hypothesis which ―implies that two types of firms are likely targets: low-growth, 
resource-rich firms and high-growth, resource-poor firms‖ (Palepu 1986).   Lastly, the negative 
coefficient on the Leverage variable conflicts with the Growth-Resource Mismatch Hypothesis.  
Overall, the Control Model cannot predict with enough reliability to be economically or 
statistically significant.   
4.2 Semi-Relaxed Model Summary 
The Semi-Relaxed Model is similar to the Control Model.  The Price-to-Earnings 
variable is replaced with the Net Income variable in this model.  This model includes 
observations where the Return on Equity and Net Income variables have negative values 
compared to the Control Model which omitted all negative observations.  Net Income could be a 
substitute for the P/E ratio, because we expect less profitable firms to be more likely to be taken 
over.  Also, when a firm reports negative net income, the P/E ratio does not exist (in any 
meaningful way).  Using the Net Income variable in place of the P/E ratio captures this effect.  
The liquidity variable has also been squared in this model so the logit can complete the 
estimation.  
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There are 45,288 non-target and 7,267 target observations used in the Semi-Relaxed 
Model estimation.  Summary statistics for the target and non-target normalized data used in the 
Semi-Relaxed Model are shown in Table 7 and Table 8, respectively.  The Semi-Relaxed Model 
has more than twice the number of observations as the Control Model possibly allowing for more 
economically significant results.  The estimated Semi-Relaxed Model is shown in Table 9. 
Table 7: Target Normalized Data Used in the Semi-Relaxed Model 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
     
Return on Equity .032 .734 -32.692 10.851 
Liquidity -.423 1.218 -22.826 38.551 
Leverage .268 .863 -.984 24.459 
Size .237 1.658 -1.046 34.753 
Market-To-Book -.024 .648 -1.392 31.897 
Net Income .195 1.527 -12.784 27.195 
Industry Dummy .646 .478 0 1 
Growth-Resource Dummy .066 .249 0 1 
  Observations = 7,267  
 
Table 8: Non-target Normalized Data Used in the Semi-Relaxed Model 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
     
Return on Equity -.005 1.036 -63.158 18.397 
Liquidity .068 .942 -1.819 47.586 
Leverage -.043 1.012 -26.104 53.562 
Size -.038 .841 -1.308 24.583 
Market-To-Book .004 1.045 -1.676 79.518 
Net Income -.031 .882 -45.590 22.665 
Industry Dummy .814 .389 0 1 
Growth-Resource Dummy .012 .108 0 1 
  Observations = 45,288  
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4.2.1 Semi-Relaxed Model Estimation 
Pi  = Prob (TAKEOVERi = | ROEi, GRDUMMYi, LIQi, LEVi, IDUMMYi, SIZEi, MTBi, NIi) 
where TARGETi = 1 if firm i was targeted and TARGETi = 0 if firm i was not targeted.   
P(TARGETi) = α + β1ROEi + β2GRDUMMYi + β3LIQi + β4LEVi + β5IDUMMYi + β6SIZEi + 
β7MTBi + β8NIi  
 
The Semi-Relaxed Model explains less than 5.57% in the variation of whether a firm is a 
target or non-target using the independent variables listed above.  This provides somewhat 
stronger results compared to the Control Model in terms of predicting target firms.  In contrast 
with the Control Model, every independent variable is statistically significant.  The Semi-
Relaxed Model supports the Growth-Resource Mismatch Hypothesis and the Asset 
Undervaluation Hypothesis, but provides results contrary to the Inefficient Management 
Hypothesis, Size Hypothesis, and the Industry Disturbance Hypothesis. 
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Table 9: Estimated Semi-Relaxed Model 
Logistic Regression                    Number of Observations 52,555 
         LR chi-squared(8) 2351.05 
       Prob > Chi-squared 0.0000 
Log Likelihood = -19947.965       Pseudo R-squared 0.0557 
       
Ind. Variables Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z-score Prob > l z l 95% Confidence 
Interval 
       
Return on 
Equity 
.139 .021 6.59 0.000 .097 .180 
Liquidity  .002 .001 3.05 0.002 .001 .003 
Leverage .272 .019 14.62 0.000 .236 .309 
Size .154 .015 9.98 0.000 .124 .184 
Market-to-
Book 
-.313 .031 -10.10 0.000 -.374 -.252 
Net Income .075 .016 4.71 0.000 .044 .106 
Industry 
Dummy 
-.883 .028 -31.64 0.000 -.937 -.828 
Growth 
Resource 
Dummy 
1.277 .078 16.49 0.000 1.125 1.429 
Constant -1.261 .023 -54.41 0.000 -1.306 -1.215 
 
4.3 Relaxed Model Summary 
 The Relaxed (third) Model is similar to the Semi-Relaxed Model except it eases the 
criterion for inclusion allowing observations in which any variables have negative values.  
Approximately 7,267 target firms and 52,343 non-targets are used in estimating the Relaxed 
Model.  The target observations used in estimating the Relaxed Model are the same as in the 
Semi-Relaxed Model.  The loose criteria for the Relaxed Model are meant to capture more non-
targets and potentially a more realistic and economically robust model. The summary statistics 
for the target and non-target normalized data used in the third model are shown in Table 7 and 
Table 10, respectively.  
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Table 10: Non-target Summary Statistics Used in the Relaxed Model 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
     
Return on Equity .001 1.002 -45.524 58.233 
Liquidity .05 1.300 -2.340 144.220 
Leverage -.000 1.002 -36.243 73.567 
Size .004 1.042 -1.734 27.070 
Market-To-Book .000 1.003 -57.150 49.005 
Net Income .004 1.064 -53.382 39.015 
Industry Dummy .813 .390 0 1 
Growth-Resource Dummy .053 .225 0 1 
  Observations = 52,343  
 
The logistic regression results for the Relaxed Model are shown in Table 11. 
4.3.1 Relaxed Model Estimation 
Pi  = Prob (TAKEOVERi = | ROEi, GRDUMMYi, LIQi, LEVi, IDUMMYi, SIZEi, MTBi, NIi) 
where TARGETi = 1 if firm i was targeted and TARGETi = 0 if firm i was not targeted.   
P(TARGETi) = α + β1ROEi + β2GRDUMMYi + β3LIQi + β4LEVi + β5IDUMMYi + β6SIZEi + 
β7MTBi + β8NIi  
 
The Relaxed Model predicts about 5% of the variation in firm target likelihood being 
explained by the independent variables.  This five percent explanatory power is more predictive 
than the Control Model, but, overall provides no meaningful reliability in predicting targets. All 
but two of the variables are statistically significant in the Relaxed Model.  Although this model 
tests significant (due to a Chi-squared value below .05) and 6 of the 8 independent variables are 
statistically significant, this model does not support any of the hypotheses discussed in Table 3 
except for Liquidity.  Overall, the third model cannot predict, with any economic significance, 
the likelihood of a firm being a target.    
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Table 11: Estimated Relaxed Model 
Logistic Regression                    Number of Observations 59,610 
         LR chi-squared(8) 2173.78 
       Prob > Chi-squared 0.0000 
Log Likelihood = -21011.22       Pseudo R-squared 0.0492 
       
Ind. Variables Coefficient Standard 
Error 
Z-score Prob > l z l 95% Confidence 
Interval 
       
Return on 
Equity 
-.015 .016 -0.97 0.334 -.045 .015 
Liquidity .059 .011 5.42 0.000 .038 .080 
Leverage .011 .015 0.73 0.465 -.018 .040 
Size .259 .010 24.96 0.000 .239 .279 
Market-to-
Book 
.047 .011 4.12 0.000 .025 .070 
Net Income -.208 .015 -14.16 0.000 -.237 -.179 
Industry 
Dummy 
-.870 .027 -31.73 0.000 -.923 -.816 
Growth 
Resource 
Dummy 
-1.628 .114 -14.30 0.000 -1.851 -1.405 
Constant -1.334 .023 -58.91 0.000 -1.378 -1.290 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 A summary of the findings for this study are provided in Table 12.  This study has found 
minimal evidence supporting the six hypotheses (Inefficient Management, Growth-Resource 
Mismatch, Industry Disturbance, Firm Size, Asset Undervaluation, and Price-to-Earnings) being 
tested. The idea that ―past performance does not indicate future results‖ certainly appears to 
apply in this area.  The target likelihood predictors (independent variables) during the time 
period January 3, 2000 through December 31, 2007 may have been affected by the Financial 
Crisis of 2008.  Although the crisis did not fully develop until 2008, the lax credit lending 
standards, which were in place for years prior, may have played a role in much of the 
performance of these firms.   
Future researchers should be cautious during time periods during any sort of bubble or 
possible systemic failure in the US financial system.  Perhaps the implementation of some sort of 
barometer of overall credit lending or commercial lending health metric should be used for future 
model estimations.  Upon further examination of the prior researchers‘ studies, they do not 
comment on their goodness of fit measures, but rather its ―predictive ability‖.  Since large 
institutions do this type of research regularly, the chance to exploit any market irregularities 
should be slim to none (which might be why prior researchers don‘t include a goodness of fit 
measure in their findings). If a model exists which predicts with economic significance whether 
or not a firm is a future target, the metrics used and defined appear to be more complex than 
those used in the existing literature and in this study.  After all, in an efficient, fair market 
everyone has the same information and opportunities for easy profits are wiped out almost 
instantly.  
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Table 12: Summary of Results 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Hypotheses 
Expectations 
Control Model 
Semi-Relaxed 
Model 
Relaxed 
Model 
Return on Equity - + +  
GRDummy +  + - 
Liquidity + + + + 
Leverage + - +  
IDummy + + - - 
Size -  + + 
Market-to-Book -  - + 
Price-to-Earnings -  * * 
Pseudo-R-squared  0.0016 0.0557 0.0492 
Note: * means the variable was not used in that model, ―+‖ means the coefficient was positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level, and ―-― means the coefficient was negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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